Why don’t these young people like Zhou black duck?

“  

week black duck zero sum game.
 ”

The competition among Juewei, zhouheiya and Huangshanghuang has always been the focus of the industry.

 
Founded in 2006, Zhouhei duck is a brand of stewed duck, goose and vegetarian products. From the completion of the first round of financing of Tiantu capital led investment in 2010 to listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2016, it took Zhou Heiya only six years. After listing, Zhou Heiya’s development shows a weak trend. Since 2018, its performance has declined for three consecutive years.
 
According to the financial report data, from 2018 to 2020, the revenue was 3.212 billion yuan, 3.186 billion yuan and 2.182 billion yuan respectively, with a year-on-year decrease of 1.15%, 0.79% and 31.5%. The net profit of Zhou Heiya was 540 million yuan, 407 million yuan and 151 million yuan respectively, with a year-on-year decrease of 29.1%, 24.56% and 62.9%.
 
The continuous decline in performance, Zhou black duck in the original position of the three giants in the decline. According to public data, in 2020, another company, Huangshanghuang, achieved an operating revenue of 2.436 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 15.09%, successfully surpassing Zhou Heiya and ranking second in the industry.
 
For three years, profits have been declining, and revenue has been regressing continuously. Instead of breaking through the No.1 position of Jue Wei and Lu Wei, Zhou Heiya has been overtaken by Huang Shanghuang. What’s the problem with Zhou Heiya, who was once sought after by the consumer market and favored by the capital market? Based on this, this article will start from Zhou Heiya’s “product positioning” and try to dismantle the thinking errors behind its logic.
In April this year, Zhou Heiya released the company’s annual report for 2020. In 2020, Zhou Heiya’s revenue was 2.182 billion yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 31.5%; The net profit was 151 million yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 62.9%, and the data performance was very poor.
 
Meanwhile, the total sales volume and purchase unit price of Zhou black duck declined. According to the data, the total weekly sales volume of black duck in 2020 was 25800 tons, down 28.13% from 35900 tons in 2019; And the average consumption of Zhou black duck per purchase order decreased from 62.18 yuan in 2019 to 60.67 yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 2.43%.
 
The reason for the poor performance of the black duck in the week of 2020 was attributed entirely to COVID-19’s sharp decline in passenger traffic and declining sales. But is that really the case?
 
It is true that Zhou Heiya, whose store is headquartered in Wuhan, has been greatly affected by the epidemic, and its performance has declined greatly. However, it can not be avoided that Zhou Heiya’s performance has declined for two consecutive years as early as 2020, before the decline in revenue and bleak data. How can the company explain this situation?
 
In xinmou’s view, the decline of Zhou Heiya’s revenue and profit has long been foreseen. Zhou Heiya, which is located in high-end leisure, is different from the other two giants in pricing, taste, packaging, consumption scenarios, marketing strategies and other aspects. It is this kind of positioning that limits Zhou Heiya’s development space, and makes Zhou Heiya feel constrained in gaining customers and opening stores. For this conclusion, the author will be discussed in detail later.

 
Therefore, as we can see, Huang Shanghuang, which was founded six years earlier than Zhou Heiya, has been in the limelight in the first few years of Zhou Heiya’s establishment. However, since 2017, the revenue gap between the two companies has been narrowing. By 2020, Huang Shanghuang has achieved a reverse in terms of revenue and net profit, and successfully promoted from “third brother” to “second brother”.

“鸭”力山大
 
In addition, for Zhou Heiya, the competitors are not just “big brother” Jue Wei and the new “second brother” Huang Shanghuang.
 
According to the data, Juewei, Huangshanghuang and zhouheiya only account for about 15% of the total market share of the brine products industry in 2019, especially the combined market share of zhouheiya and Huangshanghuang only accounts for about 6%. This also means that it is not impossible to run one or two giants out of the remaining 85% of the market.
 
Figure: concentration ratio of brine products industry by retail volume CR3
 
Zhou Heiya is in a dilemma because he can’t compete with the other two giants forward, but also faces the breakthrough of other brands at any time backward.
Different from Juewei positioning leisure and Huangshanghuang positioning dining table, Zhouhei duck’s initial positioning is high-end leisure. From the later development point of view, it is precisely because of “high-end”, which limits Zhouhei duck.
 
From the product packaging point of view, different from the other two bulk based, Zhou black duck based on food safety considerations, adopts the packaging method of locking fresh. The disadvantages of fresh packing are obvious. The fixed weight reduces the purchase flexibility of customers, and the price of fresh packing is significantly higher than that of bulk packing.
 
Take three famous duck necks as an example. According to the data, the unit price of Juewei and Huangshanghuang is 25-35 yuan per order, while that of Zhouhei duck is 40-60 yuan per order. Not only that, Zhou Heiya, who is high-end, is also significantly higher than the other two in terms of product pricing. The daily price of 32 yuan / 250 g is about 1.6 times that of Juewei and Huangshanghuang at 39.8 yuan / 500 g.
 
On the one hand, for a single individual, the available product types are limited, which limits consumers’ choice of consumption quantity; On the other hand, high price positioning also has a certain inhibitory effect on the per capita consumption of consumers. From these two aspects, we can see that Zhou Heiya’s high-end strategy not only does not bring greater competitiveness to the brand, but also makes the company fall into the dilemma of empty fame and no sales.
 
From the perspective of store layout, Zhou Heiya’s early store location is mainly in high-speed rail, airport, comprehensive shopping supermarket and other areas, which is basically in line with the company’s gift / high-end leisure bittern brand tone. However, due to the high rent and fierce competition in high-speed railway, shopping supermarket and other areas, the company is facing great pressure in human resources, management costs and product transportation.
 
In terms of channel laying, before 2019, zhouheiya has been mainly in the direct marketing mode, and the number of direct marketing stores accounts for more than 90% of the total number of stores. In 2018, zhouheiya’s self operated stores accounted for 86.5%, online channels accounted for 9.4%, and distributors and other channels accounted for 4.1%. This means that the operation of the company basically depends on the direct stores.
 
Figure: comparison of the number and proportion of stores in Juewei, Huangshanghuang and zhouheiya (source: wind, Guotai Junan Securities Research)
 
Although the profit margin level of the direct mode is significantly higher than that of the franchise mode, and it has certain advantages in product quality control and store standard unification, the direct mode also limits the spread of the company scale.
 
Compared with the franchise mode, the direct store belongs to the asset oriented mode, which requires high capital and manpower for the company, and its expansion speed is far less than that of the franchise mode. By 2020, the total number of zhouheiya’s stores is 1755, while the number of Huangshanghuang’s stores in the same period has reached 4627, which is twice that of zhouheiya. And from the beginning of 16 years, Zhou Heiya’s store expansion showed a weak trend, and the speed of store expansion was also declining.
 
The expansion of stores is the first step to seize the minds of consumers. The larger the scope of brand expansion in the country, the higher the popularity of the brand, and the higher the priority of consumers for the same category of products. At present, zhouheiya’s stores are mainly distributed in the first and second tier cities, covering only 121 cities. Compared with 338 in Juewei and 220 in Huangshanghuang, zhouheiya still has a lot of space to sink.
 
Restricted by the positioning of high-end brands, Zhou Heiya can’t meet consumers’ expectations for high-quality and low-cost products by relying on quality. However, the direct store mode with high self-esteem limits store development and market sinking. The resulting gap in scale is also the main reason for Zhou Heiya’s continuous decline in performance and industry status.
 
Zhou Heiya, who wants to differentiate by “high-end” positioning, is actually trapped in his own logical trap.

盲目高端化
It’s not that Zhou Heiya didn’t realize the existing problems. In fact, since the company opened its franchise in 2019, it can be seen that Zhou Heiya is lowering his attitude, but it doesn’t seem to have achieved the desired results.
 
In April of 19, Zhou Heiya went online to lock the fresh new packaging. Compared with the old packaging, the new packaging is smaller in weight. It seems that it is intended to meet a small number of customers’ shopping needs, so as to break through the limit of consumer consumption and enhance the competitiveness of products. But compared with online stores, the price of offline stores is significantly higher, and the company itself invests more in online marketing, so most consumers are more willing to shop online, and the number of consumers entering offline stores is decreasing year by year.
 
If the high cost of rent, labor and transportation can not be converted into the consumption rate of customers entering the store, no matter how large the online traffic is and how high the consumption is, it is also a kind of consumption and waste for the company itself.
 
Since the company released the franchise in 19 years, as of October 2020, the number of franchise stores has reached more than 500. The main forms of franchise include: franchise, single store trusteeship and employee creation. It is not difficult to see that Zhou Heiya’s self price reduction is intended to break through the management radius by transforming the franchise mode, alleviate the pressure brought by the rising operating costs of Direct stores, and improve the performance.
 
But according to the 2020 annual report, the result is not ideal. Data show that in 2020, the revenue of Zhou Heiya’s self operated stores is 1.4 billion yuan, while that of its franchise stores is only 140 million yuan, accounting for less than one tenth of the total revenue.
 
In fact, the reason why the franchise store’s revenue is lower than expected is very simple. Compared with the other two companies, Zhou Heiya’s franchise was opened up a little too late. When most of the prime locations and consumer markets were completely divided up, Zhou Heiya began to expand its stores. Naturally, there was no competition.
 
Secondly, because Zhou Heiya adopts the supply mode of central supply and national distribution, the construction of supply chain is very important for the development of sales. However, judging from the supply system of Zhouhei duck, there are only four production capacity bases in China, namely Wuhan in Hubei, Cangzhou in Hebei, Dongguan in Guangdong and Nantong in Jiangsu. The base in Chengdu, Sichuan, is still in production. If you look at Juewei food, it has more than 20 production bases in China, and even Huangshanghuang has six production bases.
 
Figure: five production layouts of Zhou black duck
 
The low production capacity brought by the supply chain shortage has hindered the expansion of stores, and from the consumer side, it often receives feedback from problems such as the product date is not fresh. The decentralized production base layout, large distribution radius and long average distribution time all lead to the performance of franchise stores far from expectations.
 
Because of this, Zhou Heiya’s joining requirement has dropped from the initial 5 million yuan of self owned funds to 300000 yuan in June 2020. The further lowering of the franchise threshold reflects Zhou Heiya’s embarrassment of trying to lower her figure and being beaten in the face by reality.
 
On the road of Zhou Heiya’s growth, the positioning of “high-end” has always been a big obstacle to the company’s pace. Whether it is high pricing or only direct marketing, it is Zhou Heiya’s performance of tying himself to a high cabinet. Even if he chose to join in later, his own fund of 5 million can clearly show that Zhou Heiya is not sincere enough and bent down.
 
In the view of Zhou Fuyu, the founder of Zhou Heiya, “Zhou Heiya’s biggest opponent is himself”. But now, Zhou Heiya is in a dilemma. I don’t know whether Zhou Fuyu will keep the original argument.
Author: Ya ting; Source: xinmou (ID: xinmouls), reprint authorized. Joining the community: Cherry (wechat: 15240428449); Business cooperation: Amy (wechat: 13701559246). Recommended reading “five questions” of hyaluronic acid  |  2021 next innovation award  |  Sugar crisis   |  100 billion light food|   2021 the most innovative company in the world   | | |  |  |  Collagen Peptide  |  Daily new walnut stew: Isee trend  |  Editor’s  |  Reader’s  
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Why don’t these young people like Zhou black duck?
相较于加盟模式,直营店属于重资产模式,对于公司的资金、人力要求高,在扩张速度上远不及加盟模式。截止2020年,周黑鸭的总门店数为1755家,而同一时期的煌上煌,门店数量已经达到了4627家,是周黑鸭的两倍之多。且从16年开始,周黑鸭的门店扩张呈现出疲软态势,门店的扩张速度也在不断下降。
 
门店的扩张是对消费者心智抢占的第一步,品牌在全国扩展的范围越大,品牌的知名度也就越高,消费者对于同品类产品选择的优先级也就越前。目前,周黑鸭的门店分布主要集中于一二线城市,覆盖城市数仅121个,相较于绝味的338个和煌上煌的220个,周黑鸭仍有很大的下沉空间。
 
受制于高端品牌的定位,周黑鸭依靠品质无法满足消费者对于物美价廉产品的期待,而自视清高的直营门店模式,限制了门店开拓和市场下沉,由此造成的规模上的差距也是导致周黑鸭业绩持续下滑和行业地位退步的主要原因。
 
想靠“高端”定位打出差异化的周黑鸭,实际是陷入了自己设置的逻辑陷阱之中。

折腰挽尊
周黑鸭不是没有意识到存在的问题,其实从2019年公司开放特许经营加盟权开始,就已经可以看出周黑鸭在放低自己的姿态,只是似乎并没有取得理想的效果。
 
19年4月,周黑鸭上线锁鲜新包装,相较于旧包装,新包装分量更小,似乎意在满足客户少量多种的购物需求,以突破消费者消费数量的限制,提升产品竞争力。但是相较于线上,线下门店的价格明显较高,并且公司本身在线上营销的投入更多,因此大多消费者更愿意在网上进行消费购物,线下门店的进店消费人数在逐年减少。
 
高昂的房租、人工、运输成本投入,如果不能转化为顾客的进店消费率,就算线上的流量再大,消费再高,对于公司本身来说也是一种消耗和浪费。
 
而自19年起公司放开特许经营权后,截至 2020年10月,公司的加盟店已经达到了500家以上,主要加盟形式包括:特许加盟式、单店托管式和员工内创式三种形式。不难看出,周黑鸭此次自降身价,意在通过转型加盟模式,突破管理半径,减缓直营店经营成本上升带来的压力,提升业绩。
 
但根据2020年年报来看,结果却不理想。数据显示,2020年周黑鸭自营门店营收14亿元,而加盟门店营收仅有1.4亿元,占总营收的不到十分之一。
 
造成加盟店营收不及预期的原因其实很简单,对比其他两家来看,周黑鸭的加盟开放来的太晚了一些,在黄金地段和消费市场大都被绝味、煌上煌瓜分殆尽之时,周黑鸭才开始门店扩张,自然是竞争不过。
 
其次,由于周黑鸭采取的是中央供货,分销全国的供应方式,因此供应链的建设对于销路的开拓就十分关键。但从周黑鸭的供应体系来看,目前在全国仅有湖北武汉、河北沧州、广东东莞、江苏南通四大产能基地,四川成都的基地还在投产当中。再看绝味食品,在全国已经拥有20多个生产基地,就算是煌上煌也拥有六大生产基地。
 
图:周黑鸭五大生产布局(来源:公司公告,新眸整理)
 
供应链短缺带来的产能低下对门店的扩张形成了牵制,并且从消费端来说经常会收到产品日期不新鲜等问题的反馈,而生产基地布局分散,配送半径大,平均配送时间长都导致了加盟店表现远不及预期。
 
也正是因为如此,周黑鸭的加盟要求从最初的500万自有资金降至了2020年6月的30万元。特许经营门槛的进一步放低,其背后反映出的周黑鸭尝试放低身段不成,反被现实狠狠打脸的尴尬情况。
 
在周黑鸭成长的这条路上,“高端”的定位始终是困住公司脚步的一大障碍,不管是高定价还是仅直营,都是周黑鸭将自己束于高阁的表现。即便是此后选择放开加盟,五百万的自有资金也明显可以看出周黑鸭诚意不足,弯腰弯得不情不愿。
 
在周黑鸭的创始人周富裕看来,“周黑鸭最大的对手就是自己”,但如今,周黑鸭已经陷入了腹背受敌、进退两难的境地,不知道,周富裕是否还会保持原先的论调。
作者:亚婷;来源:新眸(ID:xinmouls),转载已获得授权。
加入社群:Cherry(微信:15240428449);
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