the story of
will start in 1927.
at that time, even in the United States, household refrigerators and air conditioners had not been popularized. People bought ice to relieve the summer heat and store food in summer.
then, the clerk of an ice making company store in Texas found that people still had a lot of demand for daily food after they closed in delis, supermarkets and other places, so he suggested that the store should also provide milk, bread and other goods while selling ice.
because the ice store has longer business hours than ordinary food stores and the refrigeration environment is convenient for storage, the head office believes that this is profitable, and it has been rapidly extended to the whole company after a short pilot.
this is the predecessor of 7-11. The first step of
convenience store from 0 to 1 happened to hit the pain point of the retail format at that time: in the era of no refrigerator, the more you buy, the less you buy, the less you eat, the distance between consumers and products gradually becomes farther and farther after the popularity of private cars, and the immediate demand for close distance is difficult to be met.
and the southern ice making company happens to have excellent conditions for cold chain transportation and refrigeration. At the same time, because the network goes deep into residential areas, it has achieved great success after taking advantage of the favorable weather, location and people.
in 1947, Nanfang ice making company officially made the convenience store independent. It was named 7-11 because its business hours were from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. later, the convenience store gradually developed into the main business of Nanfang ice making company, helping the ice selling company avoid the doomsday after the invention of the refrigerator and expand its territory to retail, petrochemical and other fields.
in 1959, the sales volume of the southern company was nearly 100 million US dollars. Ten years later, this figure increased to 900 million US dollars.
in 1974, the number of 7-11 stores reached 5176. Suzuki minwen, director of ITO Yokado of Japan, who went to the United States to study, found the business opportunity of this business model and successfully won the franchise of 7-11 in Japan through business operation. At that time, in order to protect individual small businesses, the Japanese government was strictly limiting the business hours of large supermarkets. In the post-war era of high economic prosperity, the Japanese market had a great demand for convenience stores that were open 24 hours and could simply provide daily necessities. In the same period, Japan’s local consumer brands also ushered in a big outbreak. The consumption concept has changed from blindly following the trend to pursuing the real upgrading of quality. Consumers are willing to pay a little money in exchange for saving time and improving quality; They are lazy and smart, have the demand for consumption upgrading, and are unwilling to pay too high a price. It is this social environment and psychology that created a dividend period for Japan’s retail industry in the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, there were YIDELI (1972), Daiso Dachuang (1972), Muji (1980), UNIQLO (1984) and loft (1987) and other consumer goods brands we are familiar with. Another social and environmental factor favorable to convenience stores is that Japan’s family size is gradually becoming smaller, the proportion of single people is increasing, and the aging is intensifying. People need more convenient shopping. The one-time large-scale procurement originally carried out to meet the needs of multi family families gradually decreased and changed to a new procurement mode of high frequency and small amount. Therefore, although Japan had a local convenience store brand FamilyMart at that time, the market was still not saturated. Suzuki minwen’s 7-11 quickly blossomed everywhere in Japan. Lawson, a convenience store introduced by the United States, was also very popular after entering the Japanese market. The era of the three giants of Japanese convenience stores was opened. At that time, Japan’s GDP was about US $200 billion. In the period of rapid development, the national consumption capacity was greatly improved, and the level of manufacturing and urbanization were rapidly improving. After the Plaza Agreement, the purchasing power of Japanese yen increased rapidly, and Japan began to increase investment in high-tech industries to seek a more independent mode of economic development. Vaguely, we will find that to some extent, our market is also standing at the fork of such an era. Previously, we mentioned in an article that under the similar economic environment and consumer market, although time and space are different, UNIQLO was born in Japan and famous and innovative products were born in China. Will the formats and cultures of convenience stores in the United States and Japan be staged three times in the Chinese market? Maybe.
Before telling the Chinese story of convenience stores, we might as well take a look at the profit model of convenience stores. The operating profit of
convenience store is calculated from “gross sales profit” plus “other business income” minus “operating expenses”. In “other business income”, it includes value-added services, franchise fees and membership fees. Although this is not the main part of the profits of convenience stores, it is an important means to expand and maintain customers. 1. Value added services: most of them are convenience services that are convenient for life. They are not mainly for the purpose of profit, but an important way to improve the frequency of stores and facilitate customers’ consumption. For example, 7-Eleven established seven bank in 2001 in order to meet customers’ demand for cash during consumption. At the same time, China’s convenience store enterprises are also constantly introducing all kinds of convenience services. 2. Franchise fee: This is an important source of income for Japanese chain convenience brands. In Japan, 7-Eleven, the whole family and Rosen all joined in more than 90%. The method of “single franchise fee + gross profit sharing” adopted by Japanese convenience stores can bring a steady stream of revenue to enterprises. However, in terms of franchise methods, there are great differences between Chinese and Japanese convenience store brands, which will be detailed in Part 05. In addition, from the perspective of franchisees, the franchise fee should be deducted from the operating profit as an expense in the calculation of profits. 3. Membership fee: obtaining the income of membership fee is not the main purpose of establishing membership system in convenience stores. By purchasing membership cards, recharging, and exchanging consumer points for goods, convenience stores can enhance user stickiness and clarify consumer portraits, so as to further improve operations. Taking the whole family as an example, the cross use of customer loyalty management, die hard fan management and customer lifetime value management system can predict customers “how long they haven’t come, how many times they come and how much they spend”, and gradually form a multi-dimensional member consumption label. The “gross profit of product sales” is closely related to the type of product. Different commodity structure will affect sales revenue, which also explains why convenience stores sell breakfast, Bento and rich ready to eat food. Once a certain sales scale is reached, the gross profit of food commodities is higher than that of other commodities as a whole. Taking 7-Eleven and the whole family as an example, the gross profit of processed food, fast food and daily food is more than 30%, while that of non food goods is about 20%, and that of the whole family is even as low as 16%, about one third of its fast food goods.
this also makes convenience store brands make great efforts in the development of brunch products. Although the gross profit is high, the elimination speed of meal products is also very fast. Under the fierce competition, convenience stores must continue to strengthen the development of new products and seize the taste buds that consumers are easy to be tired. With experience in the U.S. and Japanese markets, it seems that Japanese convenience stores are bound to win in the open Chinese market. But the reality taught them a lesson: the whole family realized headquarters profits eight years after entering China, Rosen realized full profits 25 years after entering China, and 7-Eleven has not even made profits in the Chinese market. What happened to convenience store giants in China? We might as well start from the 1990s when Japanese convenience stores first entered China.
In 1992, 7-Eleven took the lead in entering the Chinese market and opened five stores in Shenzhen, which has just experienced the southern speech. In 1996, Rosen chose the first stop in Shanghai; In 2003, the whole family FamilyMart came late and opened its first store in Shanghai. The big three chose the two leaders of reform and opening up: Shenzhen and Shanghai. The reason is simple: the greatest value that convenience stores can provide is convenience. Convenience is only useful to busy people. Therefore, the more time sensitive cities need convenience stores. Those who are willing to go to the convenience store at a higher price must be those who are in a hurry, unwilling or unable to pay the mobile cost of time and space. Compared with the price, they need to quickly meet their basic needs. Therefore, convenience stores can only take root in highly urbanized areas. In the convenience store industry, the regional average annual income of more than 3000 US dollars is usually regarded as the turning point for the popularity of convenience stores. In 1997, the average annual wage in Shanghai was only 11424 yuan and that in Shenzhen was 16531 yuan. At that time, Shanghai and Shenzhen could not catch up, let alone other second and third tier cities. In China in the 1990s, it was not the consumption power of Shenzhen or Shanghai people that supported the development of convenience stores, but the future of these two cities and even a country. A more intuitive comparison is reflected in the products sold. In the 1990s, the bus fare in Shanghai was $1, the ferry fare was $4, the Xiasha Shao sold $5, and the youdunzi sold $25; Fried beef buns for 60 cents, bright bags for 50 cents a bag of milk. In rosenli in the same period, the fried scallion cake and fish chop cost 2.5 to 3.5 yuan; Beef hamburger, cheese hamburger and roast chicken hamburger are the cheapest 4 yuan, and even more expensive 6 yuan. It’s almost ten times the market price. Up to now, it’s equivalent to 25 yuan for a steamed stuffed bun and 130 yuan for a hamburger. It’s outrageously expensive. The real “convenience” store is actually “someone else”. They are competitors that can not be ignored when Japanese convenience stores first entered China. They are affectionately called “cigarette paper stores” or “canteens”. Those husband and wife stores that have assumed the function of convenience stores have deeply rooted in China’s towns and villages and grown their own shapes. The owner of the canteen seems to know people all over the world. He is the Koc of that era. Everyone within a kilometer is his private traffic. The canteen can be on credit, which is equivalent to the current flowers; The canteen can also wholesale zongzi moon cakes and cold drinks. The neighbors gathered together to experience the “community group purchase” in the 1920s 20 years in advance. At that time, in addition to the commercial function, the canteen carried the social and cultural function. In the age of underdeveloped entertainment and communication facilities, the canteen was the social activity center of the neighborhood. There you can buy not only cheap snacks and daily necessities, but also public telephones, rocking cars, egg twisting machines and other fresh things. Under the pressure of consumption power and canteens, the life of “foreign convenience stores” was not so easy in the 1990s.
The turnaround took place in 2004. The year before, in 2003, there was SARS, which was still fresh in the memory of many Chinese people. After coming out of the epidemic, China, which has joined the WTO, has welcomed many foreign-funded enterprises that have been waiting for a long time. Among them, there is one of the three giants of Japanese convenience stores: the whole family. When the “late” contestant first entered Shanghai, it set off a hurricane of convenience store struggle. At that time, 7-11 was still attacking cities and land in Shenzhen and Beijing. Rosen had entered Shanghai early and opened nearly 100 stores. The convenience stores with the background of state-owned enterprises, Haode and Haode, have opened thousands in more than two years, occupying the favorable terrain of the streets and alleys. When the whole family entered China, they took the lead in studying the distribution and pattern of convenience stores in Shanghai. Then they chose to open stores in places that could cut off the source of competitors’ customers, and fired at the “veterans” of convenience stores in Shanghai. This year, the first closed convenience store in Shanghai “made the best use of the land first” also appeared on the front page of the newspaper. In the words of Shen Jianhua, vice president of Haode convenience store, “now (2004) is the Warring States era of Shanghai convenience store.” Haode was the first to feel the attack of the whole family. The selection points of convenience stores are generally concentrated in the community, the gate of the school and the entrance and exit of the business district. Many of the family’s new stores were opened next to Haode, and even occupied a more favorable terrain with higher rent. In the documentary, the store manager of the whole family said directly: “our goal is to cut off Haode’s customers.” The whole family not only spent money to win good shops, but also made great efforts in product research and development. At that time, Bento was already popular in convenience stores in Japan, but it was still a new thing in China. In order to develop a bento suitable for the sense of Chinese population, the whole family improved the dishes on the basis of research and research. During the research and development process, Japanese employees were invited to try them and tested the price acceptance. Once Bento was launched, it immediately won the pursuit of white-collar workers around convenience stores. At that time, there was no takeout. If they couldn’t bring their own rice and didn’t want to go all the way to restaurants, white-collar workers only needed to go to the family downstairs to get a box of 6 yuan bentos. After heating, the rice was soft, nutritious and took care of the tastes of Shanghai people. The last step to steal customers is to create an atmosphere and service attitude in the store. The shop assistants of the whole family, from change to welcoming guests, are trained by professional marketing personnel. Bright shops, neat furnishings and enthusiastic clerks are in sharp contrast to Haode next door. Facing the family’s Bento attack, Haode knew it was difficult to replace it immediately, so he stared at the people’s table and launched the door-to-door service of delivering rice. However, Haode’s decision did not give full play to the advantages of convenience stores, but pulled itself back to the old business and the operation mode of supermarkets. It was not only the whole family that impacted Haode, but also the old rival Rosen began to attack the city. When the lease of Jing’an Central Hospital, one of Haode’s most proud stores, was about to expire, Ben talked with the landlord of Haode’s store about double the rent in Rosen, a far corner. Haode was unwilling to increase the price. He thought that such rent could not cover the cost, so he had to give up this proud store. At the “advanced seminar on the operation and development of convenience stores” held at Fudan University at the end of 2004, all representatives of the whole family, Rosen, Haode, Haode and other convenience stores attended. At the meeting, representatives of state-owned convenience stores denounced Japanese convenience stores for driving up land prices and disturbing business ecology. The response of Japanese convenience stores is “if there is enough turnover and can make profits, it is a reasonable rental price.” In the convenience store war in Shanghai, state-owned convenience stores obviously failed to adapt to the new competitive environment. Not bold enough, many obstacles, so that the whole family, Rosen and other foreign convenience stores gradually gained the upper hand. For more than a year, the whole family did not rush to expand outward, but opened stores intensively in various regional centers in Shanghai by means of “single point blasting” and expanded from the inner ring to the periphery. It was not until there were hundreds of stores in Shanghai that the whole family entered Guangzhou and entered the southeast. At that time, the whole family was only beyond the state-owned convenience store, and the competition with Rosen was still anxious. What really helps the whole family win Shanghai is the strategic partnership agreement signed with Shanghai Metro in 2009. The cooperation with Shanghai Metro makes the whole family occupy a favorable position in the transportation hub, become a “supply station” on the commuter road of office workers, and become the most common convenience store for outsiders to come to Shanghai. Later, the whole family successfully occupied the street corner of Shanghai. Of the 2967 stores in the family, about 2000 are in Shanghai. Such a high degree of concentration greatly improves the marginal effect of the family’s self-produced products and reduces the distribution cost. At the same time, it also won more profit space for the whole family. Among the three Japanese convenience stores, it took the lead in making profits in China. The defeated Haode began to seek expansion to the surrounding areas of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai. The Shanghai market has fallen behind, and convenience store brands are sharpening their knives and preparing to march into the national and sinking market. What is waiting for them is no longer the scattered canteens and cautious traditional enterprises. As early as the beginning of Japanese convenience stores entering China at a single point, many local convenience store brands have taken root everywhere.
In addition to the scattered troops like the canteen, which hinders the expansion of foreign convenience stores in China, there are also the “regular forces” of native convenience stores. Different from the situation that the three giants of Japanese convenience stores divide up the market, there is an obvious characteristic of “region is the king” in China.
among the top ten convenience stores in China, except for the petroleum department convenience store, which accounts for one third of the market share of convenience stores, the other eight convenience stores account for only 32% of the market share.
in the Japanese market, convenience stores are characterized by multi oligopoly and high industry concentration. In 2019, 7-Eleven, the whole family and Rosen will occupy 89% of the market share. In addition to the lack of cross regional national chains, the distribution density of convenience stores in most cities in China is also much lower than that in Japan. The most intuitive impact of this is the rise of operating costs. Because the store area is small, the storage space is limited, and most of the products sold are ready to eat products, convenience stores generally use a small amount of high-frequency distribution. Therefore, when the stores are concentrated, the supply chain cost can be greatly reduced. Therefore, for convenience store brands, only scale operation can reduce the cost of the supply chain. According to insiders, generally speaking, the profit curve of convenience stores is “U-shaped”: when operating one or two stores, they can basically make profits due to relatively small management pressure and relatively concentrated resources; When the number of stores expands to more than ten, the background investment increases and enters the stage of overall loss. Only when the number of stores reaches a certain scale can there be hope of overall profit. When Japanese convenience store brands entered China, due to insufficient store density, the original model of relying on the advantages of supply chain to obtain higher profit margin in Japan could not be brought into full play. Local convenience store brands that are more familiar with local conditions, can find golden locations and accumulate supply chain resources for a long time have greater advantages. The franchise policy also invisibly hinders the regional expansion of convenience store giants. In addition to several convenience store brands such as convenience bee and red flag convenience, they adopt the direct marketing mode. In order to occupy the market faster with limited funds, several convenience store brands, including Japanese convenience stores, have adopted the franchise mode.
although the brands of convenience stores are similar in terms of “joining conditions” and “providing resources”, franchisees are most concerned about early investment and profit sharing. Among all convenience stores, meijiayi has the lowest initial investment. But in addition to this, the biggest difference between local convenience stores and Japanese convenience stores is the sharing mode. Rosen, 7-11 and the whole family adopt the profit sharing model, and 30% – 45% of the gross profit is in the hands of the headquarters. Tang Jiu only charges a franchise fee of 2 yuan / month square meter. Based on the store area of 80 square meters, the franchise fee paid to the headquarters every month is only 160 yuan. This is undoubtedly more attractive to franchisees. How can Chinese convenience stores make profits without relying on high franchise fees? Those “local snakes” who occupy the regional market provide a better “convenience store China scheme”. Taking Shanxi market as an example, according to the 2020 China convenience store development report, there are 2650 convenience stores in Taiyuan, which has a convenience store for every 1586 people. In terms of resource allocation, the convenience store even surpasses Tokyo, where a convenience store serves 2268 people. What makes Taiyuan a “convenience store paradise” is not 7-11 and the whole family, but Tang Jiu and Jinhu. In Taiyuan, there is the nickname of “three steps and one Tang long, five steps and one golden tiger”, and most people who have been to Taiyuan are deeply impressed by the density of convenience stores in this city. In 1998, Yang Wenbin, who used to do supermarket business, went to Japan. When he came back, he made up his mind to open the first chain convenience store in Taiyuan – Tang Jiu, which opened the prelude to the development of convenience stores in Shanxi. After in-depth study of the developed convenience store formats in Japan, Yang Wenbin built his own supply chain system in combination with the local food and consumption characteristics. Around the supply chain and its own product production lines, local convenience store brands have also developed more profit models in addition to charging franchise fees. The most differentiated competition with Japanese convenience stores entering China is the deep binding between Shanxi convenience stores and social public services. In Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and first tier cities, people may be used to using mobile phones to solve everything. However, these convenience stores are the most powerful “capillaries” in the era when the online infrastructure has not been fully developed and in the fifth tier cities where digital life has not yet been popularized. In Tangjiu and Jinhu, people can not only buy necessities and ready to eat food, but also jewelry, flowers and household appliances. What’s more, they also provide services such as dry cleaning, shared leasing, collection express, pet walking, and some even have free toilets. In addition, the convenience of 24-hour business is also reflected in the living services provided at any time, such as printing and fax, payment of telephone charges, utilities and cable TV charges. I believe many candidates and interviewers forget to print their admission cards and resumes that they need the next day after midnight. If you are in Taiyuan, you can calmly go out to Tangjiu and Jinhu printing outside the community. There will always be a light on for you. The advent of the Internet era has impacted offline retail formats in various ways, but at the beginning of the development of online payment, the two giants in Xi’an have responded quickly. In 2013, Tang began to build a full channel sales network. After 2017, it focused on the operation of Alipay small program. Golden tiger also fully connected to Alipay payment in 2015, and then through the small program to pull new and convert members. These convenience stores have also completed basic digital skills training for the elderly. Aunt Liu of Taiyuan learned to use small programs and mobile payment under the guidance of the clerk of the convenience store. Due to the timely prediction of the digital situation, Tang Jiu and Jinhu built their own private domain users early to realize accurate promotion with digital technology. These accumulations have also enhanced their ability to resist risks. The epidemic in 2020 has had an impact on the whole offline business. However, they rely on online networks to make closed cities operate normally and maximize the benefits of enterprises. Before Japanese owned convenience store brands paid attention to this market, the army of convenience stores in Xi’an quickly occupied the battlefield. 7-11 (China) chairman Shinji Uchida and Rosen (China) President Shixiu Miyake both said that Tang Jiu is one of the most recognized and respected brands of local convenience stores in China. In addition to Tang Jiu and Jinhu, who stick to the Shanxi market, Meiyijia, which sits in Guangdong, has also become the second convenience store in China with 30 years of accumulation. Today, Meiyijia has more than 20000 stores in China. Dongguan, its birthplace, also ranks second in the number of convenience stores in Chinese cities with its good convenience store ecosystem. When we look to the southwest, “Shu overlord” red flag chain has become the first and only listed convenience store enterprise in China. Relying on its strong financial advantages, it has established logistics distribution centers in almost every city in Sichuan and developed its own ready to eat food production lines. Now it has more than 50% market share in Chengdu. In Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, there is a convenience store struggling with Ledou’s family. Many primary school students even learn to get together in the convenience store, play games and do their homework.
at the same time, more and more brands choose to associate with convenience stores when they cover and penetrate the country. The picture above shows the theme store of Coca Cola and ledoujia.
just like Durex’s promotion and popularization in China, it does not rely on social media, but on the occupation of channel terminal cashier. It’s convenient and not embarrassing to take a bag when checking out. Nowadays, more and more brands test and promote their new products at the cashier counter of convenience stores by increasing the price. Regional convenience store brands are on their own territory, and Japanese convenience stores such as family, 7-11 and Rosen are struggling to expand in these regions. Therefore, in this industry, it seems difficult to have a real national head brand in China. To sum up, these regional leading brands, which are the “playing board” of China’s convenience stores, have the following characteristics: 1. They have learned the experience of Japanese convenience stores, such as consumer service awareness, the development of ready to eat food line, and the construction of supply chain and cold chain transportation system. 2. It started early. When Japanese convenience stores first entered China and haven’t been laid out in depth, they have a firm foothold in a certain region. When the network is dense, the supply chain is perfect, and the revenue capacity is naturally improved. 3. The most important thing is that they understand the Chinese market, the local conditions and customs, the soil in which they take root, and the ordinary people living in it. By providing rich additional public services, gather popularity and meet people’s needs. 4. In the face of the impact of Internet e-commerce and community group buying, these old convenience stores with streamlined structure and not young can respond in time with a keen sense of smell, identify their own advantages and study countermeasures suitable for their own development path. Just like 7-11 and Rosen’s “church apprentice, starved master”, they were later acquired by Japanese Chaoshang group; Meiyijia and Tang Jiu, who learned from the experience of Japanese convenience stores, finally fought back against Japanese convenience stores on the soil of China.
The competition between Yuanqi forest and farmer springs continues. The “golden position” on the shelves of convenience stores is an alien sports drink today and may become a treasure mine tomorrow. The convenience store terminals carrying brands are also secretly competing, with more favorable prices, more delicious hand-held cakes, and the benefit division of product decentralization… Convenience stores are also balancing the balance of profit and flow. 7-the founder of eleven, minwen Suzuki, wrote in the philosophy of retail: People always habitually think that the fewer competitors in the market, the better for themselves, but once there are no competitors, the career often stops. Just like the petroleum department convenience store, which ranks first and third in the number of stores in China, there are few competitors relying on the unique advantages of the service area of the gas station. The convenience stores on the corner do not have such “advantages”. They are surrounded by wolves, facing high rent and labor costs, as well as suffocating peer distribution density. Take Shanghai Qiantan world trade business district as an example. Within a few hundred meters of the phase III office building, there are two Yike, a family and a Rosen, not to mention McDonald’s and KFC, which are standard accessories of the business district and potential competitors of convenience stores. While the offline competition is becoming more and more intense, the competitors of convenience stores also appear outside the street corner. If online shopping and e-commerce have more impact on large offline stores with non immediate demand, the emergence of takeout, community new retail and community group purchase will have a greater impact on the business of convenience stores. In the face of these changes, convenience stores have actively embraced digitization. But obviously, they are not as nervous as Chaoshang. When the sales of beverage brands fight in front of the door for better placement and purchase recommendation, their hearts are half put back in their stomachs. Because they know that even if e-commerce and new retail are popular again, convenience stores will always have business as long as they live offline. They are more alert to the eager new entrants and the giants who stick to the city. Big fish eat small fish in various industries. Relying on stronger background strength, these peers are eyeing customers crowded with their narrow stores. Tang jius, who have their own “mountain”, are trying to keep their territory. After all, no matter how solid the city is, it can’t withstand the continuous temptation of preferential treatment and conceptual innovation beyond cognition under the strong financial support. The battlefield of convenience stores has not been extinguished. The future story will be the same as before. It is unknown whether the latecomers will swallow up their predecessors or whether today’s giants have held their ground. And looking back, what is a convenience store? It is a channel, a front warehouse and a display area. The war on China’s street corners will continue. With China’s ongoing urbanization. With the improvement of the old urban area, the construction of the new area is slowly carried out. At night, the streets of the city are quiet. The lights of convenience stores are always on at the corner…
References:  top 100 convenience stores in China in 2021, CCFA  development report of convenience stores in China in 2021  United States 7_ 11. The ups and downs of convenience stores, Chen Jingbo  the franchise of American Southern Company, Ji yongru  looking back on ITO yanghuatang, Wang Qing  has never been to Tang Jiuhe Jinhu, let alone you have been to Taiyuan, poor travel network  how awesome Shanxi convenience stores are, and “Shenzhou” social public opinion  convenience stores are another home of Taiyuan people in Shanxi. Why don’t they have a national brand? In the past 26 years, local convenience stores in China, catering bosses have participated in  convenience stores in the 1990s, refreshing Shanghai People’s understanding of products and services. The morning news  decisive battle to sink the market: can convenience stores be better than Mom and pop stores? New retail business review  Fengrui report 13: read China’s consumption upgrading, first look at Japan 40 years ago, Fengrui capital  family’s 7 billion member business, Shanghai people are in the pit. Commercial real estate headlines  2021 beverage War: Giants encircle the vitality forest, 36 krypton  Shanghai convenience store dispute – seize the desire of 1.3 billion people, NHK
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