A 6031 does not have as much money as they do, nor does it have such a large and extensive influence. You must establish a new value network. You can not compare with them, and you should supplement them.
A few days ago, I published the article “listen to LP, Zhong Xue’s high valuation exceeds 4 billion yuan” on China investment. This article interviewed several investors and practitioners of the consumption track, including Qing Yong, the founder of tomato capital.
Tomato capital is a comprehensive investment institution focusing on catering, food and its upstream and downstream industries. It has invested in such brands as Banu Maodu hot-pot/" 22375 rel="nofollow" target="_self">hot pot, Momo dim sum Bureau, wangjiadu prefabricated dishes, Xiong Daye dumplings, Fei chef, Ma claw claw, and Mitra vegetable meat. The whole industry chain ecology based on catering investment is the characteristic of tomato, including narrow door Society (training), narrow door food eye (data), narrow door supply chain (upstream and downstream industry chain docking), catering consulting (supply chain, food safety, human resources, financial and tax planning, etc.).
Originally, I just wanted to ask him to express his views on the pricing of “ice cream assassins”, but I didn’t expect that he was separated from me for more than an hour. After listening to Qing Yong’s Thoughts on the pricing of food and beverage products, from products to categories, brands, and investment standards, I can’t help but sigh that even though there are some commonalities between consumption tracks, the business logic of retail and catering is not small.
As an industrial investment institution, focusing on catering is actually quite luxurious today.
On the one hand, this luxury is reflected in the overall environment. Due to the impact of the epidemic, everyone sees the plight of offline catering; On the other hand, it is said that consumption, especially catering, is not a cyclical industry, but in the eyes of many capital, it is an out and out cyclical track. Nothing to vote for? Investment and consumption; Too late to follow the wind? Investment and consumption; Can’t catch up with hard technology? Engage in consumer technology!
Up to now, I can still remember last year’s catering craze. Ramen noodles, coffee and single stores are constantly bombarding the eyes. Now? It’s all news of consumer investors being laid off and changing jobs. Maybe one day consumption and catering will be hot again, and a group of investors and institutions will continue to rush in. After all, the only lesson that mankind has learned from history is that it has not learned any lessons from history.
Therefore, for those who really love catering and want to engage in the catering industry, we might as well take a look at the logic of an organization that is committed to the catering industry in both favorable and adverse circumstances, and Qing Yong’s thinking on product pricing, from products to categories to brands.
Originally, I wanted to adjust the order and bring the more dry content to the front, but in the end, I still felt that it was unnecessary to instill it. It seemed that it was to refine the essence and save time, but in fact, this utilitarian mentality was a detour. I’d better try to keep it as it is, so as to have a more chatting feeling and a complete dialogue and thinking process,
The following is the full text of the interview.
Wild editorial department: how about your recent investment?
Qing Yong: Recently, we have been working hard to see that several projects have been implemented.
Wild editorial department: I feel the epidemic
I don’t think we will make any judgment on whether we can IPO in the end. However, any target may have high expectations during the whole consumption foam period, and it may take many years to digest this valuation.
Maybe the investor’s mood during the foam period is also a herd effect. You have written that some investment institutions are not in tune with each other and directly invest in them, right? Then, according to the valuation, it may take one or two hundred years for the dividend to return to the capital, but it doesn’t matter. Anyway, someone will take the offer; There is no risk control in the terms, that is, the money will be paid first, and the terms will lie flat; Even in order to be able to participate in this project, they may use every possible means, including intimidation and threats, even coaxing and cheating, drinking and lying down, kneeling and licking, and blocking doors.
However, returning to this year’s situation, when the whole consumption is cold, the projects that have been kneeling and licked, and even the projects that have signed agreements, may be broken. For various reasons, no payment can be made, no delivery can be made, and even the projects are said to be dying. That’s the mood.
But did you say that the subject matter has changed? Nothing has changed. Therefore, I think (some institutions) still have no investment cognition. The judgment of the target is not based on logic, nor on the so-called long-term doctrine, nor on the understanding of the industry, the recognition of the founders, or the discovery of the value of the target, but on the investment sentiment of the market: everyone thinks it is good, so I think it is good. Anyway, I will find various good reasons to pile it up.
Wild editorial department: is this sentiment most obvious in consumption?
Qing Yong: I don’t comment on other industries because we focus on catering. In the catering consumption, this situation is very obvious, because some of the targets we invested in last year (some institutions) blocked our doors, and even threatened, “we will cooperate in the future. You should give us opportunities or how, otherwise we will not be able to do it in the future.”.
This year, great changes have taken place in attitude. I’m wondering if the subject matter has changed? We know very well that nothing has changed. What has changed? It is because the investor’s mood has changed, so he has found many reasons to prove that he has invested and followed a great project. Then, when the investor’s mood retreats, he finds many reasons to prove various problems of the project.
Wild editorial department: tomatoes mainly cover food and beverage. Have you ever thought of doing FMCG?
Qing Yong: our core is still deep cultivation based on catering and catering industry. Our first is based on the food chain, of course, it also includes the food chain of offline physical stores. We are not good at, nor can we understand, those who are purely online and have no traffic sovereignty, or even those who burn traffic and advertisements.
Therefore, tomato is an offline chain based on catering and food, as well as various service providers in the supply chain behind it, and food technology at the back end, that is, it can form 10 times faster new technologies that can change efficiency and improve quality for the supply chain and catering food enterprises at the front end. These are all our concerns.
Wild editorial department: let’s talk about today’s issue. Is there a supply chain and then a brand, or can it be like
Qing Yong: if it is an enterprise incubated by us, there are uncertainties in many things in the early stage. We will give pricing suggestions and analysis based on its entire business logic.
Wild editorial department: can you give us a general example of the logic and idea to give him a pricing proposal?
Qing Yong: what we give is a pricing strategy. For example, we help taoniang to eat small hotpot, which is a sub brand hatched by Banu and a fast-food hotpot.
First, Banu is already a relatively high-priced hotpot, and there are also middle priced hotpots in the market, such as Haidilao and Tan yaxue, and then there are hotpots like Xiabu and Xiabu.
So when we considered taoniang at that time, it was the fast food of hot-pot/" 22375 rel="nofollow" target="_self">hot pot. The logic is that the price of hot-pot/" 22375 rel="nofollow" target="_self">hot pot into fast food is the consideration of the extreme price. The strategy is to try our best to make it the lowest price and still make money. To what extent can we still make money,
We analyzed the take out orders across the country. 86% of the prices were below 30 yuan, but there were almost no chain brands below 30 yuan. That is to say, although the orders were the largest, it was difficult to make money from the pricing of this price band. Between 30 and 40 yuan, accounting for about 10%, of which 64% of the revenue is contributed by Dalian lock. That is to say, the chain rate is the highest in this price band.
On the contrary, if we want to realize the real fast-food chain and have a large enough user group, we need to be infinitely close to the large price band, but at the same time, the price may be slightly higher than the largest one, and maintain a certain profit. Only then can we realize enough profit to support the chain.
Therefore, 30 to 40 yuan is a relatively suitable price. As for the final pricing of the enterprise, it is also related to the purchasing capacity of the back-end, the efficiency of the overall supply chain and the management efficiency of the store. We only give pricing strategies. Taoniang’s pricing strategy is the ultimate cost-effectiveness. We want to make fast-food hotpot with the lowest price in China, such as vegetarian hotpot with less than 20 yuan and meat hotpot with less than 30 yuan. That is to say, the highest customer unit price cannot exceed 30 yuan. The range of 28.8 yuan to 29.8 yuan is the high price. This is the pricing strategy.
There is also a differentiated pricing. For example, uncle Xiong’s consideration at that time was relatively simple, that is, the price should be lower than that of the restaurant food, because you have no restaurant food; It’s higher than frozen dumplings. Because it’s a present package, the price band is set between frozen dumplings and Tangshi dumplings. How much is it? At this time, it still depends on your cost structure and efficiency, because you want to make money eventually. Of course, it should be as low as possible. Why? It should be popular enough, so this is what we call the pricing strategy.
Wild editorial department: so have you ever tried to contact high-end catering brands?
Qing Yong: in general, high-end catering brands do not belong to our focus, but there are also some interactions.
In general, high-end catering brands have high demand for food materials and high demand for cooking
If some items are not occupied, will you succeed in occupying that item? No, because first, it needs a large user base. If it is assumed that it is a small product, its user volume is too small. Once you focus on a certain product, it is difficult to support the scale. To a certain extent, the performance will be diluted, so you cannot make small products.
In addition, the popularity risk of a single item should be considered. A single item that has not experienced historical precipitation may be very popular this year, but it will not be popular next year, and people will not eat it the next year. Therefore, it is necessary to find those categories with anti popularity and anti popularity. Commodities without addiction are easy to become popular. Only commodities with addiction can resist popularity.
Even if it is anti epidemic, it does not mean that everything will be all right. Another problem is the maturity of the supply chain. Once a single product is relatively mature and hot, it will drive the maturity of the back-end supply chain, and any brand at the front end can be classified. Just like crayfish, once the category is generalized, even a fast-food restaurant will serve crayfish, and your special crayfish restaurant will be greatly challenged. Because it is less difficult for consumers to obtain, although you are the number one, your advantages will be greatly diluted.
So the third thing is the challenge brought by focusing on single products. Single product is always a phased strategy. We only establish market awareness and optimize our back-end supply chain through the explosion of funds. When this part is completed, the product is equal to the category. Later, we need to upgrade from category to brand, and finally we need to build a brand.
What consumers ultimately want to recognize is not products, nor categories, but brands. In this process, it is necessary to move from single product to multiple products, and extend your product values to other products. For example, Banu pushes Maodu hotpot. Maodu is a product, and there is a value behind it called Productism. Papain fermentation is healthier and more natural, and all products are treated with such a value.
I push that the lunch meat of wangjiadu is low-temperature lunch meat, the bean sprouts in well water are bean sprouts without medicinal water, and the duck blood is the first fresh duck blood that has passed the food safety certification… Every product is based on the product principle. At this time, consumers are no longer affected by the fluctuations of the product, and the values behind the product are recognized. At this time, the brand is established and the cycle can be traversed.
Therefore, in the end, the food enterprise upgraded to the most scarce and valuable thing, that is, the brand that the enterprise ultimately wants to build. For Banu, the core is not maw, nor hot-pot/" 22375 rel="nofollow" target="_self">hot pot, but Banu. It needs to go from tripe to hotpot, and then to Banu. Like Xi tea, we all agree that it is not meat grapes, but based on products to fruit tea products. Finally, Xi tea, an innovative and inspirational tea, is a brand with spiritual attributes, which is its success.
Of course, there are also some low-priced ice cream tea drinks made by snow ice city, right? In fact, it is just a point, but the value of ice cream tea drinks is universal to every product, that is, it is enough
Wild editorial department: a brand created through large-scale online marketing and low prices. If there are no values and consumers do not know what to buy, the brand is actually a logo.
Qing Yong: I don’t comment on these brands online. We don’t understand. However, some brands with rapid scale expansion offline, if they do not convey certain values, will actually decline very quickly. The first place of growth this year may be the first place of store closure next year. This situation often occurs in my report. Simple scale is meaningless.
Consumers continue to re purchase, on the one hand, they are addicted to the things themselves, on the other hand, they are addicted to the body, and on the other hand, they are addicted to the spirit. Physical addiction is easy to be replaced. You sell coffee, I also sell coffee, you sell hot-pot/" 22375 rel="nofollow" target="_self">hot pot, I also sell hot-pot/" 22375 rel="nofollow" target="_self">hot pot.
Online brands (this problem) is more prominent because online traffic is about equal to sales volume and re purchase is low. Why? Because it cannot convey values through various scenarios, there are too few paths. Offline brands are relatively easy to build because you want to come to our store to contact people and the environment and experience my services and products. If you do well in all aspects and have enough contacts, it is relatively easy to build a brand.
Why do some online brands with little foundation come and die quickly? It’s because the customer contacts the brand. Maybe only when planting grass and buying things. Although the sales volume is large enough, what kind of trust do you convey to the customer? I’m afraid this is not solid. So I think it’s useless to just look at sales. Last year, we didn’t set up a company. The sales were particularly high. The sales of a single store was about 20 square meters, and the revenue was 1 million. Moreover, the queue was very strong. We think there is no reason for this brand not to invest, right? We finally rejected it.
Wild editorial department: why?
Qing Yong: we can see that there are hundreds of thousands of members in total, and about several thousand of them have re purchases. The highest number of re purchases is only 4 times a year, and only 1% of customers have re purchases. This means that customers do not really agree with you. You are not a brand, you rely on traffic, you open the store in the most popular position, you do a lot of marketing actions, and people consume based on a phenomenon.
Wild editorial department: which factors do tomato investment value more or most?
Qing Yong: the first is the selection category. First of all, we hope to find a category that is large enough and just enough. This is the first category. Most of the projects we invest in, accounting for more than a majority of them, should be just needed. They are the most close to the public consumers, food materials and prices. They are the things that people want to eat no matter whether the economy is good or bad. They must be calculated on a daily basis, or even on a meal basis.
If its rigid demand attribute is slightly weak, what we are looking at is the brand added value, that is, it is either enough rigid demand or high enough brand added value. What is the brand added value? Just like what you said, consumers are willing to go further and even pay extra premium (of course, it does not mean that the brand needs to do this)
Just like Banu, if it is simply a belly, it is a flank war. You can make maw, I can also make maw, and I can find your supplier. Why does it still have more consumers to consume? It’s not because of its belly, it’s Banu’s Productism versus Haidilao’s servism, which is the core.
Because the focus of Haidilao is on service and people, and the focus of Banu is on products. As for the income of 100 yuan, how much I distribute to the people and how much I distribute to the products is more here and less there. This is a natural choice. Therefore, it is necessary to find a natural bug in its strategic design. As long as it continues to strengthen in your field, it will only be attacked forever.
Of course, in its field, you only have to be beaten. For example, if shakeshack chooses the anti efficiency strategy, you have to accept about 200 stores, and you have to accept the slow growth. You can’t have tens of thousands of stores like McDonald’s, which is 200 times more than you, and you have to accept this.
Including our support after the vote like Uncle Xiong: you have to stand on the opposite side of xijiade to win the respect of xijiade. If you only make dumplings, you can’t do anything like xijiade. People’s products, services and quality are better than you, and their brands are louder than you. There is no way to compare with them.
Don’t compete in the value network of xijiade. You must create a new value network. If its environmental service is so good, I will remove the environmental service and sell a good dumpling at a cheaper price. At this time, it can’t learn.
What if some coffee brands do not have the ability of Ruixing digital? So the solution it chose was to make de – spatial coffee in the shopping center Therefore, each person has different advantages, and his solutions will also be different. So “irradiating the giant’s shadow with strong light” means that the strong light is in line with your advantage, and you should continue to strengthen it.
At the store model level, we usually look at the four effects of the store model. We often talk about our human effects, floor effects, timeliness and quality effects.
The so-called human efficiency is “the income generated by the salary of every 10000 yuan”. The salary and welfare expenses of an employee in a first tier city may top three or four employees in the fourth and fifth tier cities. Which is more efficient? Therefore, it is the operating income generated by every 10000 yuan of wages, which is called human efficiency.
Second, we talk about floor area efficiency. Floor area efficiency is not the income generated per square meter. What we are talking about is “the income generated by rent and depreciation and amortization of a single square meter”. Because some have only 10 square meters, but the rent is 100000. Some have 100 square meters, and the rent is only 5000. Then, with depreciation and amortization, it may be 7000 or 8000 in a month. Which floor area efficiency is higher?
Timeliness refers to the use of time, how long it takes to use 24 hours, how much revenue is generated per hour, and how many time periods are used to generate profits every day.
Quality efficiency is the number of SKUs, “return on value generated by each single product”
Qing Yong: Yes, they are neither willing nor able to do it. If we are willing to do it, we should go deep. Only through differentiation can we live in his shadow.
Source: Wild editor (ID: Wild editor), reprinted with permission. Reprint authorization and media business cooperation: Amy (wechat: 13701559246);
food people are “watching”
Tomato capital Qing Yong: Some Thoughts on food and beverage pricing, brand and cycle crossing
野生编辑部：听起来跟快消品的逻辑相反，我看包括元气森林，还是说像钟薛高，其实是品牌和产品一块出来，甚至于品牌要先行于产品，先通过打造品牌，把认知给塑造出来了，然后再去扩展其他的品类，像钟薛高火了之后，又因为供应链闲置，去做理想国的饺子。
卿永：是不是反着来我们难以评判，但是最终极的还是品牌。品牌的核心是它的精神属性，是背后的价值观，是它那些超越这种物质本身的，那些更有思想的、更有情感的东西。像元气森林核心打造的是零糖、零卡、零脂，通过打造出来的气泡水这款产品，再把这种价值观普适到更多的产品，从而树立元气森林的品牌。
我认为一个没有建立精神属性的品牌，或者说叫做一个logo，如果盲目的多元化可能会是一种消耗，因为没有一个价值观作为支撑，消费者到底是消费你的什么？如果假设只是随便消费你的东西，这个时候消费者是不忠诚的。
只有消费你的价值观，消费你的精神属性才会忠诚。因为品牌建立了一个强大的信任，背后一定是有精神属性作为依托。当然一方面有产品品牌，还有渠道品牌，像美团也是个品牌，它打造的是渠道品牌，还有一些可能掌握了线下的一些渠道，也是一种品牌。
渠道品牌也在表达渠道本身的价值观，它倡导什么价值，到底解决消费者什么问题，只有建立了这种基础，我认为才会产生用户忠诚度，才会产生持续的复购。
野生编辑部：通过大规模的线上营销和低价去打造出来的品牌，如果没有价值观，消费者不知道买你的什么东西的时候，品牌实际上就是个logo。
卿永：我不去评论线上的这些品牌，我们也不懂。但是线下有些规模扩张速度很快的一些品牌，如果没有传递某种价值观，其实没落是很快的，今年的增速第一名，有可能就是明年的关店第一名，这种情况在我的报告里经常出现，单纯的规模是没有意义的。
消费者持续复购，一方面是东西本身有瘾，一个是对身体的瘾，第二是精神的瘾。身体的瘾是很容易被取代的，你卖咖啡我也卖咖啡，你卖火锅我照样卖火锅。
线上品牌（这种问题）更凸显，因为线上流量约等于销量，复购低。为什么呢？因为它无法通过各种场景去传递价值观，路径太少了。线下品牌相对好打造，是因为你要来我店里面与人、环境接触，要体验我的服务和产品，如果综合各方面都做得好，触点足够多，打造品牌相对容易。
一些根基不深的线上品牌，为什么来得快、死得快？是因为顾客接触品牌的触点，可能只有种草和买东西的时候，虽然销售额足够大，但是你传递了一种什么样的信任给到顾客呢？这恐怕是不扎实的。所以我觉得光看销售有些时候没用，我们去年否了一家做公司，销售特别高，单店20来个平方营收100万，而且排队排得很厉害，我们觉得这种品牌没有理由不投是吧？我们最终把它否了。
卿永：我们看到总共几十万的会员，大概有几千个会员是有复购的，复购的次数最高一年也只有4次，只有1%的顾客有复购，这代表顾客没有真正的认同你，你不是一个品牌，你是靠流量，你把店开在最火爆的位置，你做了很多营销的动作，大家是基于一种现象来消费。
野生编辑部：番茄投资更看重或者是最看重哪几个因素？
卿永：第一还是选品类，首先希望找到相对规模足够大、足够刚需的品类，这是排在第一位的。我们投的大部分项目，占到大部分以上应该都是刚需的，最贴近大众消费者、食材和价格，是人们无论经济好坏都要吃的东西，一定是可以日来算，甚至于以餐来算的频次。
如果它的刚需属性稍微弱一点，我们看中的就是品牌附加值，也就是说要么足够刚需，要么有足够高的品牌附加值，这个品牌附加值是什么？就是刚刚跟您所说的一样，消费者愿意走更远来消费，甚至于付出额外的溢价（当然并不代表品牌需要这么做），这就是品牌附加值。
第三个无论任何品类还是品牌，都要有一个食物最基本的东西：成瘾性，如果没有成瘾性作为基础，消费者不会给你足够的时间来去树立品牌。
野生编辑部：我理解您这几个点应该是一个“与”的关系，它应该不是一个“或”的关系，或者说至少前两点跟第三点之间应该是一个“与”的关系。
卿永：是的，成瘾性是必须的，前两点是只要有一个就可以，因为刚需和品牌价值之间，两者之间短期内是存在互斥关系的，从长期来说都会走到一起。
然后就是战略模型，包含总体战略切入和门店模型两个部分。我们希望所有的品牌都能找到对标，这种对标不是说要复制谁，而是说你的差异是什么。
我们内部有一条很重要的投资理念，“用强光照射巨人的阴影”，什么意思？就是你需要找到在任的、足够大的头部品牌，你要找到他们品牌核心竞争力所带来的问题面，然后站在它的对立面提出一个解决方案，如果一个品牌没有这种“站在巨人的对立面提出解决方案”的能力，我们会认为战略的设计可能比较短期。
像Shake Shack站在麦当劳的对面，它是用反效率逻辑来立足，当头部品牌意识到你会威胁到它的时候，却无法追随、模仿你，无法跟你竞争，只能在既定的赛道里面挨打。
我们举一些负面的案例，比如说你做披萨，我做水果披萨，看似短期内会有出圈的机会，但是从长远来说的话，其实必胜客也可以做，而且它的产品可能做得更好，因为它的供应链更强大，成本更低，渠道也更广，只是愿不愿意去做（的问题）。
所以这种短期优势是头部品牌可以学习的，它不是阴影面的解决方案，而只是一个侧面的解决方案，是不长久的，除非是资本快速推进完成整个过程，并快速完成迭代，形成规模效应，否则只要反应稍微慢一点，就会非常被动。
就像巴奴如果单纯是毛肚的话，它就是个侧翼战。你做毛肚，我另外也可以做毛肚，你的供应商我也可以找得到。为什么它依然还有更多的消费者去消费？不是因为它的毛肚，是巴奴的产品主义对标海底捞的服务主义，这才是核心。
是因为海底捞的焦点在服务、在人上面，巴奴的焦点在产品上面。一百块钱的收入，我分配多少到人上，我分配多少到产品上面，这边多了那边就少了，这就是一个自然的选择，所以必须找到它战略设计的一个天然bug，只要在你的领域里面持续加强，那么它永远只有挨打的份。
当然在它的领域里面你也只有挨打的份，这也得认，比如说ShakeShack选择反效率战略，你就得接受200来家店，你就得接受慢慢成长，你不能像麦当劳一样几万家店，它是你200倍，你就必须接受这个事情。
包括我们像做熊大爷的投后支持也是一样：你要站在喜家德的对立面，才会赢得喜家德的尊重。只做水饺，你怎么干都干不过喜家德，人家产品、服务、品质各方面都比你好，品牌也比你响亮，根本没办法跟它比。
不要在喜家德的价值网络里面比，你必须拉一张新的价值网，它的环境服务做得那么好，我就去掉环境服务，就卖一个好的水饺，价格更便宜，这个时候它学也学不会。
像一些咖啡品牌没有瑞幸数字化的能力怎么办？所以它选择的解决方案是在购物中心里，做去空间化的咖啡.所以每个人的优势不同，他的解决方案也会有差异。所以“用强光照射巨人的阴影”指的强光就是符合你的优势，而且要在优势上面继续加强。
门店模型层面，我们通常就看门店模型的四效，我们经常说的我们人效、坪效、时效、品效。
所谓人效就是“每万块钱工资所产生的收入”，一线城市一个员工的工资和福利开销，可能顶得上四、五线城市的三、四个员工，哪个人效更高？所以是每万块钱工资所产生的营业收入，这个才叫人效。
第二我们说坪效，坪效不是每平方米产生的收入，我们所说的是“单平方的租金和折旧摊销所产生的收入”，因为有些只有10个平方，但是租金10万，有的有100个平方，租金才5000，然后的话加上折旧摊销可能也就一个月也就7000、8000，哪个坪效高？
时效就是说时间利用，24小时利用了多长时间，每小时产生了多少的收入，每天产生利润的利用时间段有多少。
品效是SKU的数量，“每个单产品所产生的价值回报”，因为SKU会影响后端供应链的效率，SKU越多，供应链效率就越差。所以“多快好省”其实是在传统餐饮行业是不存在的，“多”就没办法“快好省”，你只有放弃“多”你才能“快好省”，所以品效是很重要。
然后我们还是看人，看创始人和团队，要么懂年轻人，要么自己是年轻人。还是要抓住年轻人，这个品牌才会有未来，当然这只是其中一部分，还有比如自我的学习迭代能力，追求理想，可能每个人都有不同的观点，说白了就是要一个优秀的团队，最终其实差别还是在于人。你战略设计错了，人可以改变；品类选错了，人可以重新选。所有东西都还是回归到人本身。
最后就不同阶段就看不同的东西，孵化项目看这4样就差不多了，把模型看完，模型就等于数据了，因为只要模型好后期复制就会好。
如果是成长阶段，我们还是要看它的财务数据，还是要看数据质量，有时候规模大并不代表就一定好，我们可能看复购、翻台、同比增长、环比增长、回本周期、单店资金占用，甚至是用户评价，就是用户对他的评价，因为有些时候它发展好，但是用户评价低，有些评价虽然高，但是发展不行，那么在这两者之间如何去取舍平衡，这个是我们看的东西。
卿永：有正在准备的，但是疫情影响就没那么着急了。现在二级市场表现也就这样，慢一两年也没关系，也不急着说就在这个时间一定要上。
我们的逻辑也是一样的，番茄跟红杉高瓴你有什么区别？
没有他们那么多钱，也没有那么多大的、广泛的影响力，你就必须建立新价值网，你不能够跟他们比，要做补充。某种意义上，我们和其他机构相比，价值就在于更懂餐饮人，更尊重餐饮行业的规律。我们不做拔苗助长的事情，不逼迫大家在不那么适宜的时间做不那么恰当的事情。
卿永：对，他们不愿意做也做不了，我们愿意做就往深里做，打差异化才能够活在他的影子下面。
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